TEMPORAL SCOPE: 2016 – present (from the failed coup attempt of July 2016 through the consolidation of executive power and institutional transformation under Erdoğan)
GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT: Turkey (formally democratic republic; NATO member state; hybrid regime trajectory with weak liberal checks and strong executive authority)
Case Trigger & Political Problem #
Following the failed military coup attempt in July 2016, the Turkish executive invoked emergency powers and initiated extensive legal and institutional reforms. These actions fundamentally altered the balance between executive authority, legislative oversight, and judicial independence. The core political problem concerns how emergency governance mechanisms were transformed into durable institutional arrangements within a formally democratic system. The case examines how state institutions were restructured without an explicit regime breakdown.
Case Overview #
This case is analytically relevant because it illustrates accelerated democratic backsliding triggered by a security shock rather than by gradual electoral change alone. It highlights how executive actors can use legally authorized instruments—emergency decrees, constitutional amendments, and administrative reforms—to reconfigure institutional power while maintaining democratic formality.
The case exemplifies a governance transformation problem: how an executive responds to an existential threat while simultaneously redefining long-term institutional rules. Rather than focusing on whether the response was justified, the analysis examines how decisions taken under emergency conditions reshaped Turkey’s political system.
Context & Constraints #
Several constraints shaped post-2016 decision-making:
- Security context: The coup attempt was framed as an existential threat to state survival, creating broad tolerance for extraordinary measures.
- Institutional design: Turkey’s pre-2017 parliamentary system already exhibited strong executive influence and weak judicial independence.
- Legal infrastructure: The constitution allowed emergency rule and decree-based governance with limited immediate oversight.
- Political environment: Opposition parties were fragmented and operated under legal and media constraints.
- International constraints: EU accession leverage had weakened, while NATO membership prioritized security cooperation over democratic conditionality.
These conditions narrowed the effective constraints on executive action while preserving legal continuity.
Key Actors #
Executive (President Erdoğan and AKP leadership) #
- Interests: Regime survival, consolidation of political authority, elimination of perceived internal threats
- Resources: Emergency decrees, party dominance, control over security apparatus
- Capabilities: Agenda control, legal reform initiation, institutional appointments
- Limitations: Electoral legitimacy requirements, international reputational costs
Judiciary #
- Interests: Institutional autonomy (in principle)
- Resources: Formal legal authority
- Limitations: Purges, executive influence over appointments, restructured oversight bodies
Military #
- Interests: Organizational survival, depoliticization (post-coup framing)
- Resources: Coercive capacity
- Limitations: Extensive purges, civilian restructuring, loss of autonomy
Opposition Parties & Civil Society #
- Interests: Preserving democratic competition and civil liberties
- Resources: Parliamentary presence, public mobilization
- Limitations: Legal repression, media restrictions, fragmented coordination
Critical Decision(s) #
The central decision concerned how to govern after the coup attempt:
- Option 1: Temporary emergency measures followed by institutional restoration
- Benefits: Democratic credibility, reduced long-term legitimacy costs
- Costs: Higher perceived security risk, loss of control over state institutions
- Option 2: Institutionalize emergency governance through legal reform
- Benefits: Executive dominance, long-term regime stabilization
- Costs: Democratic erosion, international criticism, institutional rigidity
The executive chose institutional consolidation, converting short-term emergency powers into permanent governance mechanisms, most notably through the 2017 constitutional referendum establishing a presidential system.
Theoretical Lens Applied #
Democratic Backsliding Theory (Primary Lens) #
- Why it fits: The case demonstrates executive aggrandizement using legal tools rather than overt authoritarian rupture.
- Key concepts applied: rule by law, erosion of checks and balances, competitive authoritarianism.
- Explanatory value: Explains how democratic institutions persist formally while substantive accountability declines.
Path Dependence (Secondary Lens) #
- Why it fits: The coup attempt functioned as a critical juncture that redirected institutional development.
- Key concepts applied: critical juncture, institutional lock-in, increasing returns.
- Explanatory value: Clarifies why post-2016 governance became difficult to reverse even after the emergency period ended.
Political Leadership & Decision-Making (Supporting Lens) #
- Why it fits: Executive choices reflected leadership-driven risk calculations under uncertainty.
- Key concepts applied: crisis leadership, decision centralization, strategic framing.
- Explanatory value: Helps explain how leadership preferences shaped institutional outcomes beyond structural constraints.
Outcomes & Consequences #
Immediate Effects #
- Large-scale purges across judiciary, military, academia, and civil service
- Governance by decree normalized during emergency rule
Medium-Term Effects #
- Constitutional redesign centralizing executive authority
- Weakening of parliamentary oversight and judicial independence
Intended and Unintended Consequences #
- Intended: Regime stabilization, elimination of rival power centers
- Unintended: Institutional rigidity, reduced policy adaptability, diminished international credibility
The outcome was not a sudden regime change, but a reconfiguration of democratic institutions toward executive dominance.
Analytical Questions #
- Under what conditions can emergency powers be institutionalized without formal regime change?
- How might stronger pre-existing judicial independence have altered post-coup outcomes?
- Could international actors have imposed meaningful constraints without undermining security cooperation?
- To what extent did leadership choices outweigh structural constraints in shaping the trajectory?
- Is institutional reversal possible once emergency governance becomes constitutionally embedded?
