Russia-Ukraine War

TEMPORAL SCOPE: February 2022 – Present (with analytical cut-off at [specified date]) GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT: Eastern Europe and the broader international system (interstate war involving a nuclear power, indirect great-power involvement, and systemic implications for European and global security)

Case Trigger & Political Problem #

In February 2022, Russia launched a large-scale interstate invasion of Ukraine, transforming a long-running coercive dispute into sustained high-intensity war. The core political problem is how states pursue security and political objectives through force while managing escalation risks, alliance reactions, and domestic constraints. Key institutions affected include European security arrangements (notably NATO and EU policy coordination), the global sanctions/finance regime, and nuclear deterrence signaling.

Case Overview #

Analytically, the Russia–Ukraine War is a high-salience case of war as strategy under uncertainty: leaders pursue political aims through violence while continuously revising objectives, mobilizing resources, and bargaining indirectly through third parties. The case illustrates a decision-making problem in which the relevant “moves” are not one-off choices but iterated strategic commitments—force employment, mobilization, alliance management, sanctions design, and escalation control—made under incomplete information and shifting constraints. Because the conflict is ongoing, all conclusions below are conditional on the analytical cut-off date.

Analytical cut-off used in this case study: December 1, 2025.

Context & Constraints #

• Security-structure constraints: Post–Cold War European security institutions and NATO’s deterrence posture shape what external supporters can do without triggering direct alliance–Russia war dynamics. NATO’s public position that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” while linking invitation timing to allied agreement and conditions reflects these constraints and internal coordination needs. (OTAN)
• Alliance politics and coordination capacity: Sustained support requires institutional mechanisms for training, logistics, and long-term pledges, not just episodic bilateral transfers—pushing allies toward formalized coordination. (Congress.gov)
• Economic statecraft constraints: Sanctions must balance (a) revenue denial to Russia, (b) enforceability (anti-circumvention), and (c) self-inflicted costs (energy, inflation, industrial inputs). The EU’s rolling “packages” model shows iterative adjustment as circumvention and market responses evolve. (Consiglio Europeo)
• Nuclear deterrence and escalation management: Russia’s nuclear rhetoric and doctrine signaling impose a ceiling on risk tolerance for outside supporters and shape how coercion is attempted without direct NATO entry. (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP))
• Domestic political constraints in supporters: U.S. and allied assistance is mediated by appropriations, oversight, and replenishment capacity, which affects timing, reliability, and signaling credibility. (Congress.gov)

Key Actors #

Primary actors #

Russia (state leadership + security institutions)

• Interests: Prevent unfavorable security alignment on its borders; maintain regime/security legitimacy; secure leverage over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation.
• Resources/capabilities: Large conventional forces; strategic depth; energy and commodity revenues (partly constrained by sanctions); nuclear deterrent for escalation control.
• Constraints: Attrition and mobilization costs; sanctions adaptation/circumvention dynamics; alliance consolidation against it; credibility and bargaining limits created by the war’s duration. (Consiglio Europeo)

Ukraine (state leadership + armed forces + society)

• Interests: Survival as a sovereign state; territorial control; durable security guarantees; economic viability.
• Resources/capabilities: National mobilization; battlefield adaptation; international legitimacy; reliance on external military, financial, and industrial support.
• Constraints: Dependence on external supply chains; war weariness and infrastructure damage; limited ability to compel outcomes without sustained partner backing.

Indirect but pivotal actors #

NATO (as an institution) + key member states (notably the U.S.)

• Interests: Deter spillover and direct Russia–NATO conflict; maintain alliance cohesion and credibility; support Ukraine while managing escalation risk.
• Resources/capabilities: Collective logistics, training, interoperability, and standard-setting; large industrial and financial base across members.
• Constraints: Consensus politics; differing risk tolerance; domestic politics; managing the line between support and co-belligerency. (OTAN)

European Union (institutions + member states)

• Interests: European security; economic stability; rule-based response to aggression; energy security and resilience.
• Resources/capabilities: Sanctions authority; market power; regulatory capacity; financial support tools.
• Constraints: Varied member exposure to energy/industry shocks; sanction enforcement complexity; unanimity and coalition-building requirements. (Consiglio Europeo)

Critical Decision(s) #

Because this is an evolving conflict, the “critical decisions” are best understood as repeated strategic choice points:

1. Russia’s decision to wage large-scale war and sustain it over time

• Options (stylized): limited coercion/grey-zone pressure; negotiated settlement on narrower terms; large-scale invasion; later escalation/de-escalation pathways.
• Trade-offs: speed and coercive leverage vs. long-term costs (attrition, sanctions, alliance pushback) and the risk that war consolidates Ukraine’s external alignment.

2. Ukraine’s decision to fight for survival while tying strategy to external support

• Options (stylized): rapid capitulation/neutralization; limited resistance to preserve state remnants; full mobilization with sustained defense and counterpressure; negotiation under varying battlefield and support conditions.
• Trade-offs: mobilization burdens and infrastructure losses vs. sovereignty and bargaining position; operational autonomy vs. dependence on partner timelines and constraints.

3. NATO/U.S./EU decisions on support design under escalation risk

• Options (stylized): minimal support (avoid escalation); robust support (shape battlefield balance); phased support (manage risk and domestic politics); institutionalize support (reduce volatility).
• Trade-offs: deterrence credibility and Ukraine’s viability vs. escalation management; speed vs. oversight and replenishment; alliance unity vs. policy maximalism. (Congress.gov)

4. Sanctions and energy decisions as “war-sustaining” choices

• Options (stylized): narrow targeted sanctions; broad sectoral sanctions; price caps and shipping restrictions; accelerated energy substitution and enforcement escalation.
• Trade-offs: revenue denial and signaling vs. enforcement feasibility and economic blowback; unity maintenance vs. “sanctions fatigue.” (Consiglio Europeo)

Theoretical Lens Applied #

Conflict Theory (primary lens) #

• Why it fits: The case centers on how coercion, bargaining, and escalation operate when actors pursue incompatible security and political objectives under high uncertainty.
• Key concepts applied: coercive bargaining, escalation control, credible threats/commitments, deterrence vs. compellence, war as an information-revealing process.
• Explanatory value: Helps explain why the conflict becomes protracted: neither side can easily supply a settlement both can credibly accept, and outside supporters shape the bargaining space while trying to cap escalation—especially under nuclear shadow dynamics. (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP))

Rational Choice Theory (supporting lens) #

• Why it fits: Key decisions are strategic and iterative—actors update choices as costs, capabilities, and outside support change.
• Key concepts applied: expected utility under uncertainty, signaling, commitment problems, audience costs, dynamic incentives (time horizons).
• Explanatory value: Clarifies why support packages, sanction calibrations, and “red line” messaging are designed as signals as much as material inputs—and why domestic political constraints in supporter states directly affect battlefield-relevant credibility. (Congress.gov)

Institutionalism (supporting lens) #

• Why it fits: NATO and the EU are not just “backdrops”; their rules, consensus procedures, and coordination capacities structure feasible policy choices.
• Key concepts applied: institutional constraints, collective action, burden-sharing, path-dependent coordination, credibility through institutionalization.
• Explanatory value: Explains why allies emphasize formal statements and institutional roles (e.g., long-term coordination and membership pathways) as a way to reduce volatility and improve commitment credibility over time. (OTAN)

Outcomes & Consequences (conditional to December 1, 2025) #

• Conflict trajectory: The war persists as an extended contest of attrition, adaptation, and external resourcing rather than a short, decisive campaign—shifting the center of gravity toward industrial capacity, fiscal endurance, and alliance reliability.
• Alliance and institutional effects: NATO further institutionalizes long-term support and reiterates Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory while maintaining controlled ambiguity about timing and conditions—balancing reassurance with escalation management. (OTAN)
• Economic statecraft evolution: EU sanctions expand through successive packages, adding enforcement tools and adjusting measures (including energy-related mechanisms) as circumvention patterns and market conditions evolve. (Consiglio Europeo)
• Nuclear-risk environment: Nuclear signaling remains a central constraint on outside intervention levels and shapes how support is framed (defensive, phased, risk-managed) rather than open-ended war entry. (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP))
• Political risk spillovers: The conflict increases systemic risks: energy-price volatility and supply reorientation, defense-industrial mobilization pressures, and heightened escalation sensitivity across Europe.

Analytical Questions #

1. Under what conditions do prolonged wars shift from “battlefield contests” to “alliance and industrial capacity contests,” and how should that change each actor’s strategy?
2. Which is more decisive for credibility in this case: material capability (weapons, money) or institutional commitment (rules, multiyear pledges, coordination mechanisms)? Why? (Congress.gov)
3. How do sanctions regimes adapt when enforcement and circumvention become a strategic game of their own? What indicators would tell you sanctions are changing incentives versus merely changing rhetoric? (Consiglio Europeo)
4. How does nuclear deterrence shape the “support ceiling” for indirect participants, and how can allies signal resolve while still signaling restraint? (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP))
5. If you were designing a “settlement feasibility test,” what minimum commitments and verification mechanisms would be required to make commitments credible for both sides—given the commitment problems visible since 2022?